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Abstract 
This paper explores how the rate of home-ownership and income inequality are 
related to the formation of social capital using panel data from Japan during the period 
19862006. I have used Dynamic Panel estimation to control unobserved 
prefecture-specific fixed effects and an endogeneity bias. I have found through this 
estimation that the rate of home-ownership enhances the participation in voluntary 
activities, leading to social capital accumulation. This is in accord with findings from 
the United States (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the concept of social capital has had a great influence on various 
fields of social science1. There are various definitions of social capital such as a social 
network, interpersonal trust, or social norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.  If 
social capital is defined as social network, social capital can be accumulated through 
participation in community and voluntary activities (Putnam, 2000). This view can be 
explained formally by the simple investment theory (Glaeser et al., 2002). From a 
regional viewpoint, empirical analysis has been used to explore how social capital is 
formed based on the decision making of individuals; the suggestion is that home-owners 
are less likely to move from their current residences, and therefore are more inclined to 
invest in their local social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2007).  
Nonetheless, a social network of neighbors generates benefits for residents2. This 
benefit disappears if households move, thereby reinforcing low residential mobility (Kan 
2007). This implies that if social capital can be strongly accumulated, people are less 
likely to move away (David et al., 2010). However, there seems to be a reverse causality 
whereby people are apt to move to places and become home-owners where social capital 
formation is perceived to be larger, leading to an estimation bias. Furthermore, the 
culture and history of a residential area are also thought to influence a resident’s 
decision-making concerning investment in the social capital of that area. 
The estimation result is thought to suffer from biases such as the endogeneity of 
home-owners and the omission of an unobserved fixed effect of a residential place. 
Although DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) used the instrumental variable to offset this 
                                                   
1 Recently, researchers from the field of regional science have been interested in the 
issue of social capital (see Glaeser and Redlick 2008; Kilkenny 2006; Westlund 2007). 
2 Social network considered as social capital appears to contribute to technological 
diffusion among colleagues (Yamamura 2008a). 
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endogeneity bias, they did not control for the unobserved fixed effects. By using panel 
data from the 47 Japanese prefectures3 over the period 19862006, this paper employs 
the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel model (hereafter the AB model) to simultaneously 
control for the unobserved fixed effect and endogeneity bias at the prefectural level. 
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: In section 2, data, 
method of analysis and estimation strategies are described. The results of the 
estimations and their interpretation are provided in section 3. The final section offers 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
2.1. Data 
Following the discussion in Putnam (2000), the degree of civic engagement such as 
volunteer activities is considered to be an investment in social capital in this research4. 
I have obtained the proxy for investment in social capital from the report "The Survey of 
Time Use and Leisure Activities" which provided prefectural data on the degree of 
participation in volunteer activities every five years from 1986. This survey was 
conducted by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications. Besides the proxy for investment in social capital, the rate of 
                                                   
3 A Japanese prefecture is roughly equivalent to a state in the United States or a 
province in Canada. 
4 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) used various variables as proxies for the investment of 
social capital because civic engagements covered various activities in daily lives. 
Participation in volunteer activities reported in "The Survey of Time Use and Leisure 
Activities" was divided into a number of categories. For instance, the survey for 2001 
provided data for10 kinds of volunteer activities related to (1) health or medical 
concerns, (2) the elderly, (3) the handicapped, (4) children, (5) sports, culture or arts, (6) 
local improvements, (7) safety promotion, (8) conservation or environment, (9) disaster 
response, and (10) others. These sub-categories changed according to survey years 
although the sub-category “total volunteer activities” is available every survey year. 
Inevitably, I have not use those sub-categories providing more detailed information 
concerning investment for social capital due to data limitations.  
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home-ownership and other economic variables can be obtained for corresponding years5. 
Hence, this paper used prefectural level panel data, for each of the 47 prefectures and 
quinquennial years (1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006). Hence, the total number of 
observations is 235. Table 1 includes variable definitions, means, standard deviations, 
maximum values, and minimum values. 
 
2.2. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
It can be seen from Figure 1 that rate of participation in volunteer activities is not 
skewed. Figure 2 indicates that there is a positive correlation between the percentage of 
participation in volunteer activities and home-ownership rates. Nevertheless, the 
causality between these is ambiguous. As suggested in earlier works (DiPasquale and 
Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2007), it seems appropriate that barriers to mobility give 
individuals an incentive to invest in social capital. Nonetheless, Figure 2 possibly 
suggests a reverse causality that people tend to become home-owners where investment 
in social capital is large. I use regression estimation to clarify the causality as follows.  
The AB model allows me to control for not only the fixed effect of a residential place 
but also the endogeneity bias (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009). Using the AB model, the 
estimated function then takes the following form: 
SCit = 1SCit_1 + 1HOMEit + 2CCENTERit + 3GINIit + 4INCOMit + 5POPit + ei + uit, 
where SCit represents the dependent variable in prefecture i and year t. The lagged 
                                                   
5 The Gini coefficient of yearly income was sourced from the "National Survey of Family 
Income and Expenditure". This quinquennial survey was conducted by the Statistics 
Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in years 1984, 1989, 
1994, 1999, and 2004. It should be noted that there is a two-year lag between the Gini 
coefficient and the proxy for investment in social capital. Besides the Gini coefficients 
and rate of participation in volunteer activities, the data used as independent variables 
in the regression estimation were sourced from Asahi Shimbunsha (2008). 
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independent variable, SCit_1, is included as an independent variable. The ’s represent 
regression parameters, ei unobservable prefecture specific effects that are controlled by 
the AB model, and uit the error term. In addition to the AB model, the OLS (ordinary 
least squares) and the Fixed Effects models, where a lagged dependent variable is not 
included as an independent, are both used to check robustness. The rate of 
home-ownership, HOME, is used to capture the home-ownership effect. If a home-owner 
tends to invest in social capital, the anticipated sign of HOME is positive. As discussed 
by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), HOME is possibly correlated with unmeasured 
factors included in ut. HOME is thus thought to be an endogenous variable, resulting in 
estimation bias6, and hence, handled as such in the AB model. An endogenous variable 
is treated similarly to a lagged dependent variable. Levels of endogenous variables 
lagged by two or more periods can serve as instruments (Arellano 2003, Ch. 8). 
Community centers are places where residents of a community gather. Accordingly, 
such centers promote frequent gatherings for community activities. CCENTER, the 
number of community centers per capita, is predicted to be positive valued. An 
individual’s decision seems to depend on those that surround the individual. For 
instance, people are less likely to cooperate in resolving collective problems in more 
heterogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Yamamura 2008b). Hence, 
residents are less likely to invest in social capital if income inequality as reflected by 
GINI is relatively large. The sign of GINI is anticipated to be negative. Apart from 
variables referred as above, several control variables are also included to capture 
                                                   
6 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) used individual data to explore the effect of individual 
home-ownership on investment in social capital. They considered the average group 
home-ownership rate where an individual lives as an exogenous variable and used it as 
an instrument variable. 
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prefecture characteristics such as average income levels and population. 
 
3. Estimation Results and their Interpretation 
Table 2 presents estimations of the various variables using OLS and the Fixed Effects 
model. The Fixed Effects model controlled for the unobserved fixed effects for each 
prefecture but not the endogeneity bias. Table 3 exhibits similar results for the AB 
model where the unobserved fixed effects of each prefecture are taken into account and 
endogeneity bias is alleviated. I have attempted to estimate the elasticity so as to 
compare the magnitudes of dependent variables. Accordingly, dependent and 
independent variables are evaluated at the sample means, and therefore coefficient 
values reported can be interpreted as elasticities7. 
I begin by discussing results of Table 2, presenting the OLS result in column (1) 
and the Fixed Effects result in column (2). HOME takes positive signs in columns (1) 
and (2); however, HOME is statistically significant only in column (2). Moreover, 
coefficient of HOME for the Fixed Effect model is remarkably larger than that for OLS. 
This suggests that suppressing prefectural fixed effects alleviates the estimation bias, 
leading to HOME values that are statistically significant. Aside from HOME, 
parameters CCENTER, GINI, and INCOM display similar results for both OLS and the 
                                                   
7 For more details see Greene (1997, p.280). 
In the linear model, exy  ' , the elasticity of y with respect to changes in x is 
defined as 
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The standard error in the elasticity of y, k , can be calculated by the delta method 
(Greene 1997, pp. 278-280). 
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FE model. It is significant to note that GINI does take a negative sign. This implies that 
income inequality curbs participation in voluntary activities, resulting in a decrease in 
social capital. 
I now turn to the results of Table 3. All dependent variables are treated as 
exogenous in column (1) while HOME, CCENTER, and GINI are treated as endogenous 
in columns (2), (3), (4). In column (3), INCOME is also treated as endogenous while in 
column (4), both INCOME and POP are also treated as endogenous. Before discussing 
details of the results, it is necessary to check the validity of the estimation model. The 
consistency of the AB model estimator relies on the fact that there are no second-order 
serial correlations arising from any disturbance in the first-differential equation. 
Therefore, one should first check a test for the null hypothesis that there are no such 
correlations (Baltagi 2005, p.141). The null hypothesis is not rejected in columns (1)  
(4) and so all estimation results pass the test. Second, one needs to look at the results 
from the Sargan test, which is the test for over-identification restrictions. The null 
hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with respect to some set 
of residuals and, so they are acceptable as instruments. If the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, the instruments are valid by this criterion. Only in columns (3) and (4) is the 
p-value of the Sargan test presented not rejected. Hence, I place greater importance on 
the results presented in columns (3) and (4). 
Consistent with prediction, HOME_1 takes a positive sign and is statistically 
significant at a 1 % level in columns (1)  (4). Also in accord with expectation, the sign of 
GINI is negative and statistically significant at a 1 % level in columns (1)  (4). 
Considering Tables 2 and 3 jointly, home-owners are more likely to invest in social 
capital whereas income inequality reduces the investment for social capital. In contrast, 
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the sign of INCOM is not stable and is statistically insignificant. POP is negative in 
column (1) and positive in columns (2)  (4). POP is statistically significant in column (3) 
but not in column (4). Hence, the effects of INCOM and POP are ambiguous. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The seminal work of DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) provided evidence that a 
home-owner is more likely to become a good citizen by investing in social capital 
through participation in various social activities. However, their previous work does not 
control for the unobserved fixed effect; hence, its result seems to suffer from estimation 
bias. This paper explored how home-ownership influenced the investment in social 
capital using prefecture-level panel data during the period 19862006. Controlling for 
unobserved prefecture-specific fixed effects and using the AB model to offset the 
endogeneity bias related to home-ownership, home-owners are more likely to invest in 
social capital by participating in volunteer activities. This is in agreement with findings 
in the United Sates suggested by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999). 
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Table 1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
SC Percentage of people involved in volunteer activities (%).  30.4 5.58 46.3 17.4 
HOME 
 
Percentage of home-ownership (%). 
 
67.4 8.06 84.2 40.8 
CCENTER Number of community centers per capita (per 1000 persons). 
 
0.21 0.17 0.91 0.07 
GINI Gini coefficients 
 
0.28 0.01 0.38 0.25 
INCOM 
 
Per capita income (million yen) 2.74 0.48 4.90 1.70 
POP 
 
Population (million). 2.64 2.41 12.3 0.61 
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Table 2 Determinants of investment in social capital 
Variables (1)  
OLS 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
HOME 
 
0.02 
(0.16) 
1.20*** 
(3.43) 
CCENTER 0.01 
(1.28) 
0.002 
(0.05) 
GINI -0.38** 
(-2.38) 
-0.34** 
(-2.21) 
INCOM 
 
0.32*** 
(4.70) 
0.43*** 
(6.76) 
POP 
 
-0.14*** 
(-7.02) 
0.17 
(1.23) 
Adj R- square 0.41 0.23 
Observations 235 235 
Notes:  Numbers are elasticities. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Superscript asterisks *, **, and ** indicate significance at 10, 
5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. To save space, a constant term is included when an estimation was conducted but its result is not 
reported. 
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Table 3 Determinants of investment in social capital (Dynamic Panel model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
SC_1 
(Lagged dependent variable) 
-0.54*** 
(-5.79) 
-0.20*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.12** 
(-2.26) 
-0.09** 
(-2.34) 
HOME 
 
0.93* 
(1.89) 
0.86* 
(1.85) 
1.12*** 
(2.73) 
1.74*** 
(5.03) 
CCENTER 0.10 
(1.04) 
-0.07 
(-0.92) 
-0.14* 
(-1.77) 
-0.04 
(-0.63) 
GINI -0.68*** 
(-5.74) 
-1.66*** 
(-7.92) 
-1.65*** 
(-7.88) 
-1.18*** 
(-8.79) 
INCOM 
 
0.14 
(0.89) 
-0.07 
(-0.58) 
-0.18 
(-1.62) 
-0.16 
(-2.07) 
POP 
 
0.34*** 
(3.18) 
0.45*** 
(3.10) 
0.40*** 
(3.22) 
0.17 
(1.61) 
Serial correlation 
First order (P value) 
Second order (P value) 
 
0.88 
0.35 
 
0.00 
0.83 
 
0.00 
0.83 
 
0.00 
0.64 
Sargan test 
(P value) 
 
0.00 
 
0.06 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
Endogenous variables 
 
 
 
 HOME 
CCENTER 
GINI 
HOME 
CCENTER 
GINI 
INCOM 
HOME 
CCENTER 
GINI 
INCOM 
POP 
Wald Chi-square 
 
234 442 520 422 
Groups 
 
47 47 47 47 
Observations 
 
141 141 141 141 
Notes: Values and notations have the same significance as given in Notes to Table 2. 
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Figure 1 Distribution of percentage of participation in volunteer activities 
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Figure 2 Relationship between home-ownership rate and percentages of participation in volunteer activities 
 
 
 
 
 
